We introduce the problem of private computation, comprised of distributed and non-colluding servers, datasets, and a user who wants to compute a function of the datasets privately, i.e., without revealing which function he wants to compute to any individual server. This private computation problem is a strict generalization of the private information retrieval (PIR) problem, by expanding the PIR message set (which consists of only independent messages) to also include functions of those messages. The capacity of private computation, , is defined as the maximum number of bits of the desired function that can be retrieved per bit of total download from all servers. We characterize the capacity of an elemental private computation setting, with = 2 servers and = 2 datasets that are replicated at each server, for linear computations. Surprisingly, the capacity, = 2/3, matches the capacity of PIR with = 2 servers and = 2 messages. Thus, allowing arbitrary linear computations does not reduce the communication rate compared to pure dataset retrieval. The same insight is shown to hold at the opposite extreme where the number of datasets → ∞, the number of servers can be arbitrary, and arbitrary (including non-linear) computations are allowed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Motivated by privacy concerns in distributed computing applications, we introduce the private computation (PC) problem, where a user wishes to privately compute a function of datasets that are stored at distributed servers. Specifically, datasets are stored at non-colluding servers, and a user wishes to compute a function on these datasets. A private computation scheme allows the user to compute his desired function, while revealing no information to any individual server about the identity of the desired function. The achievable rate of a private computation scheme is the ratio of the number of bits of the desired function that the user is able to compute, to the total number of bits downloaded from all servers. The capacity of private computation is the supremum of achievable rates.
The private computation problem is a strict generalization of the private information retrieval (PIR) problem, where one of the datasets is desired by the user. The capacity was characterized recently for PIR in [1] and for several of its variants in [2] - [7] . In the PIR setting, the datasets are called messages and all messages are independent. Private computation may be viewed as PIR with dependent messages, i.e., messages whose value depends on other messages.
Our main result is the capacity characterization of an elemental instance of private computation, where a user wishes to compute arbitrary linear combinations of = 2 independent datasets (messages), replicated at = 2 servers. Note that if the user can only choose one of = 2 linear combinations that are linearly independent, then the setting is equivalent to the PIR problem with = 2 messages and = 2 servers. From [1] , we know that the capacity of PIR in this setting is equal to 2/3. Surprisingly, we show that even if the user wishes to compute arbitrary linear combinations of the two datasets, the capacity of private computation remains 2/3, i.e., in terms of capacity, arbitrary linear computation incurs no additional penalty. The same insight is shown to hold at the opposite extreme where the number of datasets → ∞, the number of servers can be arbitrary, and arbitrary (including, possibly non-linear) computations are allowed. While the asymptotic result is relatively straightforward, the elemental setting requires sophisticated structure in the queries in order to optimally exploit message dependencies. Specifically, the private computation scheme utilizes an optimized symbol index structure, and a sophisticated assignment of signs ('+' or '−') to each symbol in order to optimally exploit the linear dependencies.
Notation: For integers 1 , 2 , 1 ≤ 2 , we use the compact notation [ 1 : 2 ] = { 1 , 1 +1, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 2 }. The notation ∼ is used to indicate that and are identically distributed.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND DEFINITIONS
Consider the private computation problem with = 2 servers and = 2 datasets. We will assume that the datasets are replicated at both servers, that the servers do not collude, and that the functions to be computed are linear combinations of the messages. We will focus primarily on this basic setting which opens the door to numerous other open problems through various generalizations, e.g., > 2 datasets, coded storage instead of replication, > 2 servers, some of which may collude, symmetric privacy requirements, non-linear functions, etc.
The two datasets, denoted by 1 , 2 ∈ ×1 , are each comprised of i.i.d. uniform symbols from a finite field . In -ary units,
A linear combination of these datasets is represented as a dependent message,
where , are two constants from . ≥ 2 and the vectors ( , ) are assumed to be pairwise linearly independent.
There are = 2 servers and each server stores both datasets ), the user decodes the desired message according to a decoding rule that is specified by the private computation scheme. Let denote the probability of error achieved with the specified decoding rule.
To protect the user's privacy, the strategies must be indistinguishable (identically distributed) from the perspective of each server, i.e., the following privacy constraint must be satisfied ∀ ∈ [1 : 2], ∀ ∈ [1 : ], ( [1] , [1] 
The PC rate characterizes how many bits of desired information are computed per downloaded bit, and is defined as ≜ , where is the expected value (over random queries) of the total number of bits downloaded by the user from both servers. A rate is said to be -error achievable if there exists a sequence of private computation schemes, indexed by , each of rate greater than or equal to , for which → 0 as → ∞. Note that for such a sequence of private computation schemes, from Fano's inequality, we have
where any function of , say ( ), is said to be ( ) if lim →∞ ( )/ = 0. The supremum of -error achievable rates is called the capacity . 1 Since ≥ 2 and the functions are linearly independent, the message sets ( 1 , 2 ) and ( 1 , 2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ) are invertible functions of each other, so, e.g., conditioning on one is the same as conditioning on the other.
III. CAPACITY OF PRIVATE COMPUTATION
Theorem 1 states our main result. Theorem 1: For the private computation problem where a user wishes to privately retrieve one of arbitrary linear combinations of = 2 independent datasets from = 2 servers, the capacity is = 2/3. When = 2, the problem reduces to the PIR problem with = 2 servers and = 2 messages, for which the capacity is 2/3 [1] . Adding more computation requirements > 2 can not help (surprisingly it does not hurt either), so the converse of Theorem 1 is implied. We only need to prove the achievability, which is presented in Section IV.
It is quite surprising that increasing the number of messages by including arbitrary linear combinations of datasets does not reduce capacity in the elemental setting of = 2 and = 2 servers. A natural question then is whether this insight holds more broadly. Remarkably, the insight is also true at the other extreme, where the number of datasets is large ( → ∞) and the number of servers is arbitrary. It turns out that in this case, again the capacity of private computation is equal to the capacity of PIR. This supplemental result is rather straightforward and is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: For the private computation problem with independent datasets, , ∈ [1 : ], ( ) = , arbitrary servers and − arbitrary (possibly nonlinear) dependent messages, ,
→ ∞ messages and servers. Proof: For Theorem 2, the achievability is identical to the symmetric PIR 2 scheme of Theorem 1 in [3] , where the functions are viewed as the messages in the symmetric PIR problem and common randomness is not used. The dependence of the messages has no impact on privacy or correctness of that scheme. The converse follows from the converse of regular PIR [1] because restricting the message set to , ∈ [1 : ] cannot reduce capacity.
IV. THE ACHIEVABLE SCHEME
The private computation scheme needed for Theorem 1 builds upon and significantly generalizes the capacity achieving PIR scheme presented in [1] , [8] . For ease of reference let us denote the original PIR scheme of [1] as PIR1 . If we ignore the dependence of messages in the private computation problem and directly use PIR1 , the rate achieved is
(
which is strictly less than 2/3 (independent of ), the capacity of private computation. To optimally exploit the dependence of the messages, we start with PIR1 and incorporate two new ideas.
(1) Index assignment: Additional structure is required from symbol indices within the queries because dependence only exists across message symbols associated with the same index. This requirement yields a new PIR scheme, that we will denote as PIR2 . If the messages are independent, then in terms of downloads PIR2 is as efficient as PIR1 , i.e., they are both capacity achieving schemes. However, PIR2 is more efficient in terms of uploads than PIR1 . (2) Sign assignment: The index structure of PIR2 seems essential to accommodate dependent messages. By itself, however, it is not sufficient. For example, the queries in both PIR1 and PIR2 are comprised of sums of symbols. Depending on the form of message dependencies, more sophisticated forms of combining symbols within queries may be needed. For our present purpose, with linear message dependencies, we will need both sums and differences. To this end, we need to carefully assign a 'sign' ('+' or '−') to each symbol. The sign assignment produces the optimal private computation scheme, denoted PC , for Theorem 1. While Theorem 1 is proved for arbitrary in the full paper [9] (version 1), in this paper we will focus on the following = 4 setting which illustrates all the key ideas.
The = 4 functions that we wish to compute are the following.
Each message consists of = 16 symbols from . Let represent a permutation over [1 : ].
( , , , ) = ( 1 ( ( )), 2 ( ( )), 3 ( ( )), 4 ( ( ))) 1 ( ( )), ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 4 ( ( )) are the ℎ symbols from message 1 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 4 , respectively, permuted by , and , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , are the corresponding signed versions obtained by scaling with ∈ {+1, −1}. Note that the same permutation is applied to all messages, and the same sign variable is applied to symbols from different messages that have the same index. Both and are generated privately, independently and uniformly by the user such that they are not known to the servers.
First we explain the index assignment step.
A. Index Assignment: PIR2
In this section, we introduce the PIR2 scheme, built upon PIR1 by an index assignment process. The index assignments are necessary because unlike PIR1 where independent permutations are applied to symbols from each message, in PIR2 the same permutation is applied to symbols from every message. Since we do not use sign assignments in PIR2 , the are redundant for this scheme. Without loss of generality, the reader may assume = 1 for all for PIR2 .
Suppose the desired message is 1 , i.e., = 1. Recall the query structure PIR1 , where we have left some of the indices of undesired symbols undetermined. , , , , just as in the original PIR scheme. In the original PIR scheme, the permutations are chosen independently for each message, so that , are not necessarily functions of , . However, here, because we apply the same permutation to every message, and because the same sign is applied to , , , , the dependence of messages is preserved in these symbols. In particular, = 3 + 3 , = 4 + 4 , and ( , , , ) = 2 -ary units.
The next three rows of the queries to each server are 2-sums (i.e., sums of two symbols) that are also identical to the original PIR scheme, because these queries exploit the side-information from the other server to retrieve new desired symbols. However, notice that because permutations of message symbols are identical, there is a special property that holds here that is evident to each server. For example, Server 1 notes that the 2-sums that contain symbols, i.e., 3 + 2 , 4 + 2 , 5 + 2 have the same index for the other symbol, in this case the index 2. Since we do not wish to expose the identity of the desired message, the same property must hold for all messages. This observation forces the index assignments of all remaining 2-sums.
For example, let us consider the next query term, * + * , from, say, Server 1. Since 2 was mixed with 3 in the query 3 + 2 , all 2-sums that include some must have index 3 for the other symbol. Similarly, since 2 was mixed with 4 , all 2-sums that include some must have index 4 for the other symbol. Thus, for Server 1, the only index assignment possible for query * + * is 4 + 3 . Similarly, the * + * must be 5 + 3 and * + * must be 5 + 4 . All indices for 2-sums are similarly assigned for Server 2 as well. Thus all indices for 2-sums are settled. Now let us consider 3-sums. The index assignments for the first three rows for the 3-sums are again straightforward, because as in [1] , these are side-information exploitation terms, i.e., new desired message symbols must be mixed with the side-information symbols (2-sums) downloaded from the other server that do not contain desired message symbols. This gives us the following query structure. Now, again there is a special property that is evident to each server based on the 3-sums that contain symbols from message . Suppose we choose any two messages, one of which is . For example, suppose we choose , and consider Server 1. Then there are 2 instances of 3-sums that contain , , namely, 9 + 7 + 6 and 10 + 8 + 6 . Note that the third symbol in each case has the same index (6 in this case). The same is true if for example, we choose , or , instead. The two 3-sums that contain , are 9 + 7 + 6 and 11 + 8 + 7 , and in each case the third symbol has the same index (7 in this case). The two 3-sums that contain , are 10 + 8 + 6 and 11 + 8 + 7 , and in each case the third symbol has the same index (8 in this case). Again, because we do not wish to expose as the desired message, the same property must be true for all messages. This observation fixes the indices of the remaining 3-sum, * + * + * as follows. The index of in this term must be 9 because the two 3-sums that contain , must have the same index for the third symbol, and according to 9 + 7 + 6 this index must be 9. Similarly, the index of in * + * + * must be 10 and the index of in * + * + * must be 11. Thus, the query * + * + * from Server 1 must be 11 + 10 + 9 . Similarly, the query * + * + * from Server 2 must be 14 + 13 + 12 .
The last step is again a side-information exploitation step, for which index assignment is trivial (new desired symbol must be combined with the 3-sums queried from the other server that do not contain the desired symbol). Thus, the index assignment is complete, giving us the queries for PIR2 . For the sake of comparison, here are the queries generated with PIR2 when = 3, i.e., when message 3 (symbols ) is desired. To see why the queries for = 1 are indistinguishable from the queries for = 3 under PIR2 , say from the perspective of Server 1, note that the former is mapped to latter under the permutation on [1 : ] that maps (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 , 15, 16) −→ (1, 3, 4, 2, 5, 9, 6, 10, 7, 11, 8, 12, 15, 13, 14, 16) The permutation is chosen privately and uniformly by the user independent of , so both queries are equally likely whether = 1 or = 3.
However, depending upon the form of the message dependencies, it turns out that the 'sums' may not be sufficient and more sophisticated mixing of message symbols may be required. For = = 2 and the dependencies that we consider in this paper, we will need sign assignments, that are explained next.
B. Sign Assignment: PC
In this section, we present the sign assignment procedure that produces the private computation scheme PC from PIR2 . The sign assignment procedure depends on . Let us choose = 3 to illustrate the process. To explain the sign assignment, it is convenient to express each query in a lexicographic order based on messages. For example, the query 9 + 7 + 6 is expressed as 7 + 6 + 9 under lexicographic ordering. Note that the lexicographic order is simply the ordering < < < and the symbol indices do not matter. The position of the * symbol within this lexicographic ordering of query will be denoted as Δ ( ), i.e., for the query = 7 + 6 + 9 , we have Δ ( ) = 1, Δ ( ) = 2, Δ ( ) = 3 and Δ ( ) = 0 where the 0 value indicates that a symbol from that message is not present in the query.
Next, the queries are sorted in increasing order of blocks, , so that the ℎ block = , contains only -sums. Each block is partitioned into sub-blocks, , such that all the queries in the same sub-block have the same value of Δ ( ). The sub-blocks are sorted within a block in descending order of Δ ( ) and numbered = 1, 2, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ . With this sorting, the query structure is represented as follows. The sign assignment algorithm is comprised of 4 steps. Algorithm: SignAssign (Step 1) Consider queries for which Δ ( ) = 0, i.e., queries that do not contain desired message symbols. The terms in these queries that occupy even positions (in lexicographic order within each query) are assigned the − sign. Thus, for example the query = 11 + 10 + 9 changes to → ′ = 11 − 10 + 9 after the sign assignment. The sign assignments for the queries with Δ ( ) = 0 are now settled. ( Step 2) If a symbol is assigned a negative sign in Step 1 then in Step 2 it is assigned a negative sign everywhere it appears. Note that any undesired symbol that appears in the query from one server, appears exactly once within the query to each server. At this point we have, = 3 (Δ ) Server 1 Server 2 1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 1, 1, 1, 1 2, 2, 2, 2
Step 3) Every query such that Δ ( ) > 0, i.e., every query that contains a desired message symbol is multiplied by (−1) +1( ∕ =1) , where is the sub-block index and 1( ∕ = 1) is the indicator function that takes the value 1 if ∕ = 1 and 0 if = 1.
(Step 4) Finally, in Step 4, for each query that contains a desired symbol, i.e., Δ ( ) > 0, the desired symbol is assigned the negative sign if it occupies an even numbered position, i.e., if Δ ( ) is an even number, and a positive sign if it occupies an odd numbered position, i.e., if Δ ( ) is an odd number.
Following this procedure, we have the final form of the queries as follows. To complete the illustration, let us also present the final queries for = 1, 2, 4. This completes the description of the scheme PC . The correctness of PC follows from that of PIR2 . The proof of privacy and optimality is presented next.
V. PROOF OF PRIVACY AND OPTIMALITY OF PC

A. Proof of Privacy
To see why this scheme is private, we show that the queries are identically distributed, regardless of the value of . To this end, we show that the query for = 2, 3, 4 has a one-toone mapping to the query for = 1, respectively, through a choice of permutation and signs which is made privately and uniformly by the user.
For example, for Server 1 and Server 2, the query for = 2 can be converted into the query for = 1 by the following mapping: However, these mappings are privately generated by the user and both alternatives are equally likely regardless of desired message. Hence, these queries are indistinguishable.
We can similarly verify that the other remaining queries for = 3, 4, are indistinguishable as well. For Server 1 and Server 2, the query for = 3 can be converted into the query for = 1 by the following mapping: The last case is when = 4. The mapping from that to = 1 is as follows. 
B. Proof of Optimality
We need to show that the scheme achieves the rate, 2/3 = 8/12. For this, we will show that the user downloads only 12 symbols from each server. Note that ostensibly there are 15 symbols that are queried from each server. However, it turns out that based on the information available from the other server, 3 of these symbols are redundant. Thus, 12 generic combinations of these 15 symbols are sufficient. 3 Let us see why this is the case for the queries from Server 1. 1 , 1 are clearly redundant symbols because according to (7) they are functions of 1 , 1 . So we need one more redundant symbol. Without loss of generality, suppose is desired ( = 3 Alternatively, random binning (Slepian-Wolf coding) may be used. 1). Then, consider the 2-sum queries that do not involve the desired message, . There are 3 such queries. However, the key is that from any 2 we can construct the 3 . In this case from Server 1 we have: 4 − 3 , 5 − 3 , 5 − 4 . But it is easy to verify that 3 ( 5 − 3 ) − 4 ( 4 − 3 ) − ( 3 4 − 4 3 ) 3 − 4 4 + 3 5 = ( 5 − 4 ). Since the user knows 3 , 4 , 5 due to the side information available from the other server, out of these 3 equations, 1 is redundant. Thus, one more symbol is saved, giving us 12 effective downloaded symbols, and the rate 8/12 is achieved. Since this is also the outer bound, this scheme achieves capacity. It can similarly be verified that the redundancy exists no matter which message is desired. Due to server symmetry, similar redundancy exists for Server 2 as well. Thus, we always have 3 redundant symbols from each server, and downloading 12 symbols per server suffices. The rate achieved is / = 16/24 = 2/3 = .
VI. CONCLUSION We introduce the private computation problem which may be seen as a generalization of the PIR problem by allowing dependencies among messages, and characterize its capacity for the elemental setting of = 2 servers, = 2 independent datasets, and arbitrary linear combinations of the two independent datasets as the possible messages. Surprisingly, this capacity turns out to be identical to the capacity of PIR with = 2 servers and = 2 independent messages. Thus, there is no loss in capacity from the expansion of possible messages to include arbitrary linear combinations in this elemental setting. Furthermore, this insight is also shown to hold at the other extreme, where the number of independent datasets → ∞ and the user may be interested in arbitrary functions (including possibly non-linear functions). While the asymptotic case is relatively straightforward, the elemental case requires sophisticated structure in the queries in order to optimally exploit message dependencies. As a final remark, we note that recently in [9] , we have successfully generalized the linear computation result to characterize the capacity of private computation as = ( 1 + 1/ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + 1/ −1 ) −1 , for arbitrary number of databases , arbitrary number of messages , and arbitrary number of linear functions.
